A Reading of Strategic Transformations and the Limits of Realistic Alternatives amid the Collapse of Governance and Ideological Shift
By: Mael Baummar
Introduction: The State-of-Empire and the Exploitation of Structural Vacuums
The concept of the “state-of-empire” offers a valuable analytical lens for examining the Syrian state’s approach to societal and sectarian pluralism during the Assad regime (Kastrinou 2016,150–161). Unlike modern nation-states, which typically govern through universal citizenship or homogenisation, the Syrian state exercises what Kastrinou calls “legitimate governance of and over difference.” Internal diversity is not merely tolerated but strategically institutionalised, becoming an instrument of authority. Through this mechanism, the state portrays itself as indispensable for maintaining social cohesion and political stability. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” of this strategy lies in the illusion of harmony: orchestrated diversity produces the perception that state authority is necessary to manage pluralism (Kastrinou 2016,147).
This framework becomes particularly relevant following the disintegration of the security apparatus that had governed Syria since 1971. On 8 December 2024, an offensive led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, under Muhammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Shara), led to the collapse of centralised authority (Sadeghi 2026,4). This was not a mere transfer of power but a structural collapse that undermined the mechanisms through which pluralism had been regulated.
Several studies have characterized Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as an Islamist governance project that, despite its attempts at localization, remains grounded in a rigid ideological framework that restricts pluralism and redefines social difference in doctrinal terms (Ajjoub 2021).
In this context, minority communities increasingly perceived the state as a conditional authority whose legitimacy was constructed on exclusionary and selective protection, rather than universal citizenship. The strategic logic of the state-of-empire, once aimed at sustaining controlled pluralism, was reproduced in a more acute and destabilising form. Consequently, public discourse among minorities shifted from demands for inclusion within the state framework toward existential questions regarding the viability of remaining in a polity incapable of fulfilling its basic obligations. The Syrian case illustrates that when the stage of controlled difference collapses, the delicate equilibrium sustained by the state-of-empire can give way to uncertainty, insecurity, and the adoption of separatist or protective strategies by marginalised communities.
From Citizenship Discourse to the Question of Survival: Sectarian-Based Violations
While some scholars emphasise the positive potential of cultural and social pluralism for citizenship and democratisation (Sadeghi 2026,36–37), the collapse of Assad’s regime allowed a jihadist vision, guided by Sharia, to dominate. Pluralism was rejected, and systematic sectarian incitement escalated to violence targeting minorities.
Widespread sectarian incitement and a culture of hate escalated into systematic violence and direct threats against minorities, illustrating the instrumentalisation of identity in the Syrian state’s governance strategies (United Nations, “Hate Speech and Real Harm”). Druze students in Syrian universities experienced targeted threats and assaults, forcing many to abandon their studies, as reported by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. These patterns of violence extended beyond educational institutions: minority-populated areas became the focus of coercive security campaigns, marked by extrajudicial killings, hostage-taking, sexual assault, and looting (Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre 07/2025; Amnesty International 09/2025). Investigations by the UN concluded that massacres and other abuses in the coastal region met the threshold of war crimes (UN News Arabic, August 2025). In Sweida, violations affecting both religious and social identities reached unprecedented intensity by mid-July 2025, according to multiple human rights reports (Amnesty International 09/2025; Human Rights Watch 01/2026). Documented abuses included forced shaving of elderly men’s beards, abduction of women, and other forms of cruel or degrading treatment, highlighting the systematic targeting of vulnerable populations (Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre 07/2025; OHCHR 08/2025).
These developments cannot be interpreted as isolated security failures; they signal the collapse of the social contract and the state’s incapacity—or deliberate complicity—in protecting minorities. The resulting perception eroded trust in the state, redirecting communities from claims of citizenship to appeals for external protection, and revealed a fundamental breakdown in the state’s monopoly over legitimate force (Weber 1919). In the aftermath, authority and legality were increasingly defined through sectarian lenses, reshaping the frameworks of protection, coercion, and legitimacy within Syrian society.
Locally, these events were not seen as isolated incidents or the result of “security lapses,” but as indicators of the social contract’s collapse and the state’s incapacity—or complicity—in fulfilling its core duties. This perception shifted trust away from the state and reframed priorities from demands for citizenship to seeking international protective mechanisms, reflecting the state’s failure to monopolise legitimate violence and provide equal security (Weber 1919). The post-collapse authority redefined law and legitimacy based directly on religious affiliation.
The Structure of New Authority: Hybrid Governance and the Limits of Law
Sweida, like other regions, experienced a model of “hybrid governance”, where remnants of official institutions intersect with actors possessing ideological religious authority. This pattern often erodes the rule of law, converting legal texts into selective instruments of control and exclusion (Mampilly 2011).
The effects extend beyond the legal-institutional realm to the socio-psychological fabric of communities. The relationship between the Druze minority and new authorities is not a conventional political conflict but a structural contradiction between a threatened collective identity and a power that views religious and cultural particularity as deviation from normative standards. The resulting “sociology of fear” reflects rational assessment rather than sectarian isolation, as communities cluster defensively around the Shaykh al-ʿAql—not as a religious alternative but as a symbolic-social reference in a sovereignty vacuum. Field events transformed hypothetical fears into direct lived experience.
International Law: Crimes against Humanity
The mid-July 2025 events constitute a pivotal moment in the collective consciousness of Sweida’s Druze minority. Given the systematic and symbolic targeting of religious identity, these acts extend beyond a local security crisis and fall within the framework of international criminal law. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, these acts can be classified as crimes against humanity, as they were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a specific civilian population (Rome Statute 1998, Art. 7). They include extrajudicial killings, torture, forced detention, and systematic sexual violence.
Where the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) asserts that the international community must act to safeguard civilians (Evans 2009). While this principle does not automatically legitimise intervention, it provides a legal framework to discuss the necessity of international or regional protection in cases of mass atrocities. Limited enforcement mechanisms further raise questions about local and social protective measures, reflecting the link between the erosion of legal state authority and marginalised groups’ search for alternatives, including self-determination or secession options.
Between Sectarian Canton and Civil Society
Discussions of independence or self-governance in Sweida are often dismissed as “sectarian cantons,” overlooking the Druze community’s social-religious structure and the civic character of traditional divisions between religious (‘uqqal) and non-religious (‘juhhal’) members (Firro 1992; Makarem 1974). Local claims for autonomy or self-administration are administrative and security responses to existential threats, not ideological or theocratic projects.
Local Discourse in Sweida: From Existential Anxiety to Self-Determination
Statements by Shaykh Hikmat al-Hajri, spiritual leader of the Druze, particularly in his Yedioth Ahronoth interview (2026), signify a qualitative shift in political discourse. Advocacy for alliances or autonomy reflects local awareness of the collapse of the national framework and state failure to protect minorities (Ynet News, January 13, 2026). This can be read as an existential response, reshaping alliances around protection rather than doctrinal belonging.
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and Remedial Secession
The right to self-determination, rooted in the UN Charter, affirms the sovereignty of peoples without threatening existing states. The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) allows non-self-governing territories to exercise self-determination. In extreme cases of severe persecution, international law recognises “remedial secession” as an exception, permitting a population to establish an independent state to remedy grave injustices (Van Driest 2013,7). The Kosovo advisory opinion and Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence on Quebec underscore this principle under conditions of structural discrimination and existential threat (ICJ 2009, paras. 4.39–4.40). Applied to Sweida, discourse on self-determination is a legal response to persecution and state failure, not an ideological separatist agenda.
Legal Pathways for Sweida: Limited Alternatives
Despite the rising discourse advocating independence, the legal avenues available to minorities in Sweida remain limited and complex due to the exclusionary nature of the prevailing religious authority. Among the theoretical alternatives:
- Expanded federalism: This could allow for a broader distribution of local powers, enabling minorities to secure greater representation and enjoy administrative rights. However, implementing this option directly depends on the central authority’s willingness to relinquish control and on the existence of a secular, religion-neutral constitution that guarantees equal rights for minorities and limits sectarian influence in lawmaking.
- Enhanced political decentralisation with international guarantees: This mechanism could enable minorities to manage their local affairs while ensuring international oversight. Its success, however, is contingent on a coherent and sustained international commitment, as well as the international community’s willingness to enforce oversight and implement safeguards.
- Limited UN trusteeship or temporary international protection: This approach would protect the national framework and ensure a minimum level of rights and security for minorities. Nevertheless, it requires direct international intervention, which depends on the international community’s readiness to engage in temporary local governance while respecting the principle of state sovereignty.
Conclusion
This study concludes that the shift in Sweida’s discourse from citizenship demands to self-determination reflects a structural state crisis, not a preexisting separatist tendency. Other legal alternatives—federalism, decentralisation, or international protection—remain theoretical and limited due to the exclusionary nature of current authority and lack of effective international will. Self-determination, including remedial secession, is framed as a legally debatable measure of necessity rather than a political aim, serving to preserve the physical existence and human dignity of a threatened group. The centralist, ideologically driven authority constrains any durable settlement, which is typically conditional and security-focused rather than grounded in sustainable recognition of equal rights or political partnership.
This analysis highlights the implications of authority in Syria on minorities and raises questions regarding the extent to which local communities can secure rights within the existing state framework and the likelihood of success for any legal option, including remedial secession, in the absence of effective international support.
References
I. International Sources and Human Rights Reports
Amnesty International. “Syria: New Investigation Reveals Evidence Government and Affiliated Forces Extrajudicially Executed Dozens of Druze People in Suwayda.” September 2, 2025. Amnesty International.
https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2025/09/syria-new-investigation-reveals-evidence-government-and-affiliated-forces-extrajudicially-executed-dozens-of-druze-people-in-suwayda/.
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Citation
Baummar, M. (2026). Swaida: From Demands for Citizenship to the Quest for Self-Determination. Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine, 1(3). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19398702
