Editorial Introduction
In the context of the rapid transformations sweeping the Middle East, accompanied by a reshaping of power balances and shifts in patterns of international and regional influence, there is a growing need for analytical readings that transcend superficial event coverage, toward interpretive approaches linking historical structures with current realities. From this perspective, this interview appears within the “In-Depth Knowledge Dialogues” section of Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine, serving as a dialogic space hosting researchers and experts to deliver analytical insights grounded in scholarly expertise and coherent critical thinking.
The magazine, as a multilingual research-journalistic platform, aims to produce robust, discussable knowledge blending academic publishing standards with journalistic presentation style. Within this framework, this dialogue with Professor Riad Al-Aisami, author of The United States and the Outcomes of the Conflict over the Middle East, is read as a contribution to understanding Swaida’s position within a broader network of geopolitical interactions, rather than as an isolated local case.
This interview treats Swaida as a microcosm of intersections between the local, regional, and international, where political geography considerations intertwine with internal social transformations, and the policies of major powers reflect in the details of everyday reality. Through this dialogue, Al-Aisami invokes the historical dimension of international interventions in the region as an interpretive entry point for grasping the present and anticipating future trajectories.
The interview questions seek to unpack several central issues, including Swaida’s place in conflict maps, the nature of local actors and their transformations, the role of cultural elites, and potentials for action amid complex structural constraints. Thus, it does not aim to deliver final conclusions so much as open avenues for argument-based analytical discussion, accommodating multiple approaches.
This interview is published in two parts, given the breadth of its themes and analytical scope, with the second part to be continued in the next issue of the magazine—allowing deeper follow-up on questions related to future scenarios and the dilemmas of political and societal action in Swaida.
Preliminary Questions
- Your recent book, The United States and the Outcomes of the Conflict over the Middle East: Geostrategic Competition and the New World Order, analyzes the role of international powers in shaping the region’s trajectories, employing a multidimensional approach integrating history, politics, geography, and economics within an analytical and prospective framework. In this context, how would you present the intellectual and methodological background from which this work emerged, the key issues it sought to address, particularly in understanding the conflict over the Middle East as part of broader transformations in the international system?
First, I would like to thank you, Mr. Nawras, for selecting me for this interview with your nascent publication, Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine, which I wish continued success in achieving its intended goals. Your choice honors me. I also see that the magazine targets intellectual and cultural elites, seeking to interpret ongoing events in Swaida, the region, the broader Middle East, and the world through an intellectual, scientific, and methodological lens.
I also thank you for choosing my book The United States and the Outcomes of the Conflict over the Middle East as the starting point for this dialogue, as it represents—in my estimation—an attempt to formulate an intellectual and research framework for engaging with current events and phenomena in the region, and forecasting its future and the conflict’s ramifications therein and thereon.
Here, I note that the book’s full title—”The United States and the Outcomes of the Conflict over the Middle East: Geostrategic Competition and the New World Order”—itself reflects the core idea underpinning the work. When we speak of “the outcomes of the conflict over the Middle East,” we refer to a conflict not confined to the region but also involving it, with multiple international powers led by the United States, confronting others vying to expand their influence there.
The reference to “geostrategic competition and the new world order,” the title’s second part, expresses the book’s concluding insight: that the outcomes of this conflict will lead to a form of geostrategic rivalry over the Middle East, and that this rivalry will be one of the factors shaping a new world order. Thus, the book offers an analytical reading viewing the conflict over the Middle East as part of wider transformations in the structure of the international system, rather than a mere limited regional dispute.
The primary impetus for writing this book stems from a set of scientific and methodological considerations rooted in my academic background. I hold a master’s degree in social education sciences, which rests on four main axes: economics, politics, history, and geography. Though taught separately, these sciences are in reality tightly interconnected through humans as the primary agents shaping events.
From this understanding, the human sciences cannot be viewed as isolated compartments but as an integrated system, akin structurally to an edifice supported by multiple pillars on a single knowledge base. In this context, philosophy serves as the foundational reference grounding the other sciences, as the overarching framework organizing human thought—from which emerge others like logic (among the first to branch from philosophy) and psychology, which later developed along paths of scientific independence.
Hence, this book is not classified as purely political work but belongs to the social sciences, relying on a comprehensive analytical approach that transcends the common reduction of politics to isolated practice. It affirms politics as a standalone science, intertwined with and influencing other human sciences reciprocally. This conception was one of the primary drivers compelling me to address the book’s topic this way—via a multidimensional approach uniting diverse disciplines within a single framework.
Additionally, this work relies on deductive logic as a primary analytical tool, predicated on the relationship between premises and conclusions, which sound premises lead to interpretable, analyzable logical outcomes. This method, rooted in Aristotelian philosophy, posits that events do not occur by mere chance but are linked to a chain of causes yielding specific results, even if those causes are sometimes invisible or insufficiently studied.
This methodological orientation also connects to my doctoral studies in educational technology, which at its core draws on strategic planning principles. Such planning involves identifying objectives from needs, then devising necessary means and plans to achieve them within a defined timeframe, with measurable and evaluable results. This can be likened to a scientific principle in physics, where variable relationships yield predictable outcomes, reinforcing the idea of an ordered causal-effect link in analyzing phenomena.
Building on this method, the book employs strategic thinking based on key questions: Where are we now? How did we arrive here? Where are we headed? How can we reach desired goals in due time? What alternatives exist if those goals falter? This thinking does not merely analyze the present but forecasts the future based on precise comprehension of historical paths and accumulations leading to the current reality.
Regarding its connection to Swaida, this intellectual project does not treat local cases in isolation from the broader context but situates them within a cumulative historical and geopolitical framework encompassing the region’s transformations since the early 20th century—from European colonialism, the World Wars, the Cold War, to the contemporary international order. From this vantage, what Swaida experiences today cannot be severed from these accumulations; it must be understood as part of a larger system of regional and international interactions forged over time.
Accordingly, this intellectual project’s link to Swaida lies in providing an analytical framework aiding interpretation of the current reality within its wider historical and strategic context—enabling deeper understanding of ongoing transformations, the bounds of local agency amid internal-external interplay, which ultimately forms one of the book’s core objectives.
- In the book, you trace a long history of international interventions in the region—from European colonialism to contemporary U.S. policies—within an analytical approach based on a cumulative reading of events linked to their temporal and geopolitical contexts. In this framework, how did you employ the analytical historical method to understand international and regional transformations, and what added value does this method provide in interpreting the Syrian reality—particularly in Swaida—through a perspective connecting past, present, and future foresight?
The method I adopted in this book launches from an analytical historical approach that tracks the course of international interventions in the Middle East over a nearly century-long period, from World War I and the Sykes-Picot Agreement to the present stage. This temporal span enabled me to view current events not as isolated incidents but as part of an integrated, sequential historical context governed by discernible patterns and behavioral recurrences amenable to observation and analysis.
According to this methodology, history is not merely a narrative of sequential events but the product of observed interactions occurring in specific times and places, which change with circumstances yet often retain certain patterns, especially regarding leaders’ and decision-makers’ behaviors. Analyzing this behavioral dimension yields deeper insight into event formation and aids in interpreting similarities across distinct historical phases.
From this standpoint, I treated the period from 1914—the onset of World War I—to 2014 as a cohesive historical phase. It began with the Ottoman Empire’s fall and the entry of colonial powers, chiefly Britain and France, into the region via Sykes-Picot arrangements; it continued through major shifts encompassing World War II, the Cold War, and up to the post-Soviet collapse era.
I see this phase’s end tied to pivotal transformations, foremost the so-called Arab Spring, coinciding with U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2008 election victory under the banner of “Change,” attempting a shift from a war-dominated historical pattern to conflict management through peaceful means. Yet this transitional phase did not complete as anticipated, instead yielding new complexities.
The structural shift became clearer in 2014 with strategically significant events, such as Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, paralleling the international war against ISIS. These developments, in my view, mark a transition between historical phases, where prior structures could no longer accommodate emerging variables.
Thus, I approach history as a series of phases, each with distinct characteristics and givens. A phase starts with major events and ends with others overwhelming its structure, leading to its disintegration and paving the way for a new one.
Engaging this historical method aims not only to comprehend the past but also to read the present more profoundly. Through it, one can interpret happenings in Syria generally—and Swaida specifically—as part of broader transformations concerning the conflict over the region and the reshaping of power balances at regional and international levels. Consequently, grasping this historical backdrop contributes to perceiving local action’s limits and aids in forecasting potential future paths.
This method rests on a causal conception for interpreting historical and political events, positing that phenomena cannot be understood apart from their causes, and every outcome results from prior premises—even if unseen or imprecisely studied. From this perspective, reading history treats it not as coincidences but as an interconnected chain of factors interacting within defined temporal and geopolitical contexts.
In this frame, the post-World War II international order was established on balances imposed by victorious powers, led by the United States, through institutions like the United Nations and Security Council. However, post-Cold War shifts—especially the U.S. rise as sole superpower—produced a new reality necessitating, analytically, reevaluation of these institutions’ structures and representation distribution, particularly with emerging economic-political powers like Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, and South Africa, whose roles no longer align with traditional representation.
In response, the United States pursued entrenching its leadership via expanding global influence—politically, economically, militarily—manifest in interventions like the Second Gulf War after Iraq’s Kuwait invasion, practically testing its ability to rally a broad international coalition and demonstrate post-Soviet military superiority. This approach also emerged post-9/11, leading to wide military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, reshaping global power balances.
Regionally in the Middle East, this analysis links certain political entities’ persistence—foremost Israel—to post-World Wars international and regional balances, viewing its emergence and continuity within a complex historical context tied to those major shifts. This view holds that any nascent political entity’s survival or demise depends on its alignment with surrounding strategic environment and actors’ interests in the international system.
Applying the same causal principle, contemporary regional developments are interpreted as extensions of interconnected events: regional crises—like post-Kuwait invasion Iraq, post-9/11 fallout, or October 7 escalations—are seen as links in a cumulative chain of political-security interactions shaping the current situation and directly impacting regional stability or conflict paths.
Accordingly, this perspective offers an interpretive reading deeming understanding of the current reality—whether in Swaida, the region, or the world—requires tracing events’ historical-political roots and analyzing cause-outcome interconnections within wider transformations in the international system’s structure.
Applying this method to contemporary regional developments, October 7 events can be seen as part of a broader transformation chain in the region, not an isolated incident. Per the causal approach, they are understood as a link in a cumulative path of political-security interactions contributing to reshaping regional power balances and reordering international and regional actors’ priorities.
From this understanding, their outcomes cannot be read in isolation but placed within dynamics of strategic repositioning by regional actors, including efforts to curtail or redistribute some parties’ influence and redefine roles amid new balances. In this context too, Syria-related transformations fit this general frame as a crossroads of multiple geopolitical considerations, given its geographic position and historical role linking regions and strategic areas.
Thus, interpreting Syria’s happenings—especially in Swaida—cannot be detached from these major shifts; it must be grasped as a reflection of local-regional-international interplay, where international system transformations and regional conflict paths directly influence internal balances, local action’s bounds, and its capacity to shape events.
- What are the core hypotheses on which the book relies to interpret the outcomes of this conflict, particularly in light of the roles of international and regional powers?
This work rests on a methodical analytical approach dividing the subject into two main parts: the first addresses understanding the historical path leading to the current situation, while the second attempts to forecast the conflict’s outcomes in the Middle East based on five specific research hypotheses grounded in cause-and-effect principles.
In this framework, the Middle East conflict cannot be treated as an isolated, momentary case detached from its historical context; it must be read as an extension of political and strategic accumulations stretching from the post-World War I era and its accompanying geopolitical arrangements—chiefly the Sykes-Picot Agreement—which established border and political structures whose effects persist today. Thus, comprehending “how we arrived here” forms an essential precondition for grasping future directions, as the future cannot be analyzed apart from the historical path that shaped it.
As for the book’s second part, it focuses on analyzing the conflict’s outcomes over the Middle East by presenting a set of research hypotheses, dividing this section into five chapters—each tackling an independent yet interconnected hypothesis within an overarching analytical frame. These hypotheses draw on the historical data covered in the first part, plus prior expertise and analyses, including previous research in this field.
These hypotheses employ causal analytical logic, formulating clear conditions linking the realization or absence of certain outcomes to the availability of specific political and strategic prerequisites. For instance, one hypothesis posits that the United States cannot sustainably end the Arab-Israeli conflict unless a comprehensive, just solution is reached for the Palestinian people’s cause. This implies that failing to address this issue’s essence keeps the conflict open to reproduction and renewal, regardless of shifting power balances or changing administrations.
Following this approach, the other hypotheses are handled similarly tying outcomes to objective conditions related to international and regional power balances, and the capacities of key actors like the United States, Russia, and China, alongside regional players such as Iran and Israel, to influence event trajectories. It also considers that these powers do not operate in isolation but within a complex web of interactions and overlapping interests defining each party’s feasible action bounds.
Accordingly, this approach’s goal is not delivering definitive future predictions but providing an analytical framework for understanding potential conflict directions—by linking past to present and extrapolating the future via cause-outcome analysis. From this standpoint, the Middle East conflict’s outcomes are understood as products of ongoing historical dynamics, not mere isolated events or ad hoc decisions—necessitating a comprehensive analytical approach accounting for internal, regional, and international interplay.
This framework continues by detailing the research hypotheses underpinning the analysis. The first hypothesis holds that the United States cannot end the Arab-Israeli conflict without a comprehensive, just solution for the Palestinian people. This conclusion rests on proposed solutions, especially the two-state solution based on post-1993 international references—no longer practically viable amid current political and field realities. Israel’s possible concessions fall short of the Palestinian side’s minimum acceptable limits, rendering a final, sustainable formula highly complex and keeping the conflict open to reactivating the same causal state and reproducing identical outcomes.
The second hypothesis addresses the Iranian nuclear program and the regional security environment, assuming the United States cannot prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities as long as Israel remains a nuclear power in the region. Regional security balances drive key actors toward deterrence options ensuring their survival and strategic security. In this context, the nuclear weapon represents a strategic guarantee for Iran’s state preservation and regional positioning—especially amid neighboring nuclear powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia; nearby U.S. military presence; and Israel.
Thus, addressing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East cannot rely on conventional military tools or partial solutions but demands a comprehensive approach revisiting regional nuclear balance holistically—an elusive prospect under current political realities, whether in international will or prevailing power balances.
The same hypothesis notes that U.S. capacity to curb Iran’s regional influence is tightly linked to rebuilding geostrategic and political balances in pivotal states—foremost Iraq and Syria. Developments post-U.S. Iraq intervention, dismantling state institutions, alongside Syria’s transformations, created strategic vacuums enabling Iran’s regional expansion via allies and networks.
Collectively, these hypotheses reveal that Middle East conflict outcomes—over and within it—cannot be severed from complex internal-regional-international interactions; any power’s ability to effect radical change hinges on addressing imbalance roots, not merely their symptoms.
Additionally, another hypothesis views the geographic expanse from Iran to the Mediterranean as having become, under current conditions, a fragile geopolitical space describable as a strategic “vacuum” or “hole,” attracting extremist or unstable currents. This stems, per the approach, from insufficiently strong, cohesive states and varying political-institutional instability levels, rendering the area vulnerable to external pulls and interventions. Hence, restoring strategic balance here is deemed essential for regaining stability—though this does not currently rank among U.S. policy priorities or direct, conclusive capabilities.
Within the hypotheses related to international balances, the third hypothesis concerns U.S.-Russia relations, positing that the United States cannot achieve a decisive victory or strategic superiority in the ongoing Ukraine war and on the European level unless it manages its relationship with Russia within a more stable framework—whether through mutual understanding or recalibrating engagement rules between the two sides. Notably, Russia maintains a strategic presence in Syria, controlling key sites, particularly on the Syrian coast, which holds immense geostrategic importance due to its Mediterranean position and ties to natural resources, including eastern Mediterranean gas reserves that have become a core factor in escalating international and regional conflict over regional energy sources. Thus, any U.S. approach to Russia cannot be detached from the Syrian theater, as one of the primary friction points between them in the Middle East.
The fourth hypothesis addresses U.S.-China relations, assuming the United States cannot sustain the strategic influence it built since World War II’s end in East Asian areas like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines if it continues engaging or overextending in other theaters—chiefly the Middle East—without reassessing its resource distribution and strategic priorities. Conversely, China is markedly expanding its influence in Southeast Asia, alongside securing vital trade routes and spheres tied directly to its economic and strategic security, compelling the U.S. to address this challenge within a broader global power balance vision.
In this frame, the Middle East gains special significance due to its energy sources and critical maritime passages like the Strait of Hormuz, plus proximity to major powers’ traditional spheres. Its geography—especially the Arabian Gulf and Iran—makes it pivotal in energy security and international balances. Hence, U.S.-Russia-China interplay here cannot be understood in isolation but within a complex web of overlapping interests ultimately shaping regional and global order, directly impacting Middle East conflict trajectories.
The fifth hypothesis, a central one in this analytical frame, rests on viewing the Syrian war not as a mere local or limited regional conflict but as an early arena of multidimensional global confrontation. From this view, what is termed World War III did not commence in a traditional declared context but formed gradually through transformations and international interventions intertwining local, regional, and global conflict levels.
From this perspective, Russia’s Ukraine intervention—especially Crimea’s annexation—marked a strategic turning point prompting the U.S. to redirect part of its strategy toward other areas, including Syria, enabling balance management with Russia without direct European confrontation. Per this analysis, Syria became a containment environment for international rivalry, rather than open direct competition in Europe.
In this context, cross-border jihadist armed groups like ISIS emerged, fittable within this frame as adding new active elements to an already complex conflict environment. Their rise and evolution cannot be grasped apart from regional-international interactions or balances governing conflict management then. Some analyses treat these groups as indirect tools in conflict orchestration, reflecting the non-traditional war nature in this region.
This approach assumes World War III’s nature—if deemed underway—differs from prior global wars in tools and theaters. Technological advances—including AI, cyber warfare, and modern indirect influence techniques—make war multidimensional, beyond conventional military clashes. Deterrence concepts evolved too: nuclear weapons are no longer solely deterrence tools but factors in broader influence-threat systems, alongside nontraditional ones.
Building on this conception, World War III’s contours arguably began in multiple areas, including Syria since 2014, with escalating pace and scope encompassing later fronts. Key current fronts: Ukraine, with ongoing Russia-Europe tensions backed by the U.S.; and the Middle East, intertwining Syria to Gaza to Iran. Analysis anticipates a potential third front in East Asia, especially Taiwan, opening escalation in China-U.S. rivalry—direct or indirect.
Thus, per this hypothesis, this war’s end requires reshaping a new world order—via great-power accords (U.S., Russia, China) or imposed outcomes by the strongest strategically in decisive theaters militarily. Hence, U.S. capacity for decisive role in this order ties directly to success managing main conflict arenas—foremost Syria and the Middle East broadly—plus balanced handling of Ukraine and East Asia challenges.
Accordingly, this hypothesis relies not on definitive outcomes but conditional probabilistic analysis via causal logic: certain results hinge on specific conditions. If met, events trend specific paths; if not, conflict persists in current dynamics without radical change.
In light of the previously outlined hypotheses, the analysis does not confine itself to forecasting isolated developments but seeks to comprehend interconnections among concurrent tension and conflict arenas. Within this frame, it anticipated the Ukraine war’s outbreak, escalation risks with Iran, Ukraine war persistence and potential extension to broader East European areas. Similarly, Taiwan is viewed as a potential arena that, should U.S.-China tensions worsen, could form an additional front in what might constitute a multipolar, multidimensional global conflict extension.
Amid these shifting balances and power disparities—between Iran, the U.S., and Israel on one hand, or Russia, China, and the U.S. on the other—the equation drives convergence among some international actors, led by Russia and China, toward strategic partnerships with regional players like Iran. Partnership here means not mere transient political alignment but long-term strategic cooperation based on intersecting security, energy, and geostrategic interests—differing from traditional understandings in depth, temporal span, and impact on reshaping international balances.
This conception stems from a hypothesis that Russia, China, and Iran’s interests converge in preventing the U.S. and allies—foremost Israel—from achieving complete regional strategic superiority, as such dominance would undermine those powers’ roles and stakes in the international and regional system. Thus, the ongoing conflict is seen as zero-sum in dimensions, with each major power seeking to block the other’s comprehensive hegemony—making outcomes decisive in defining medium- to long-term regional and global order.
Building on this understanding, current data not only analyzes the status quo but enables constructing possible future scenarios—region-wide in the Middle East, Syria-specific, or even Swaida-focused, directly or indirectly affected by these international-regional interactions. These scenarios draw on prior hypotheses as the referential frame for reading potential directions, linking political, military, and economic variables in an integrated analytical system.
Examining regional happenings now reveals the research hypotheses retain substantial consistency with practical reality: Israel, despite political-strategic efforts—including Abraham Accords or “Deal of the Century”—has not achieved reshaping the regional environment to shift from military conflict logic to economic integration for political concessions, especially Palestinian issues. This vision remains unrealized on the ground, with no clear near-term indicators of feasibility as anticipated, particularly by the U.S. and Israel.
Historically, Iran relations were managed not as direct enmity or full strategic partnership but cautious coexistence preserving regional geostrategic balance. Recent shifts—especially post-October 7 Iran escalations—altered this balance, reshaping success-failure metrics in regional-international policies, rendering prior measures obsolete for the new phase dynamics.
Despite pressures and escalation, current data indicate U.S. and Israel inability thus far to fully end Iran’s nuclear or missile capabilities. This bolsters the hypothesis that radical Iranian nuclear handling requires broader context revisiting Middle East proliferation holistically—unfeasible under current balances. Thus, Iran is expected to retain strategic capabilities, including nuclear (direct or latent), cementing its role as key regional actor confronting U.S. and Israel, reflecting also in balances with others like China and Russia.
Accordingly, the second hypothesis largely holds, unscientifically refuted to date—as do others on Russia-China ties, Syria conflict, or Middle East broadly. Russia and China’s strategic interests align with conflict persistence—not necessarily resolving for one side but suiting extended attrition strategy eroding U.S. long-term conflict management capacity.
Thus, conflict continuation reflects unstable equilibrium contributed by international-regional parties, each bolstering its position while blocking decisive rival superiority. In this context, prolonged attrition may redirect U.S. priorities toward reduced direct Middle East engagement, easing associated burdens-costs, potentially reshaping global strategic posture.
“Published after review and approval by the guest“
Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine. (2026). Vol. 1(4). ISSN: 3099-3172 (online).
