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Practical procedures for controlling Djebel-Druze

The Catroux–Trenga duo

1. Introduction

In the first article (1) of this series, we reviewed the role of Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Catroux in shaping the State of Djebel-Druze through the letters he sent to General Henri Gouraud during the last four months of 1920. He then moved into the phase of implementation on the ground by appointing Gabriel Trenga as Administrative Adviser in the Djebel, assigning him a set of tasks through a body of instructions preserved in the French diplomatic archives in Nantes, which we will examine in this article.

2. The pivotal figure

Commander Trenga (1881–1971)

Between 1921 and 1923, Catroux dispatched Officer Trenga to Djebel-Druze to carry out several duties, including:

  • Chief Administrative Adviser in Djebel-Druze.
  • Interpreter-officer.
  • Head of the French intelligence section in the Djebel.
  • Acting governor of Djebel-Druze.

In 1922, following the first military clash between the Druze led by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash and the group of Lieutenant Bouxin, which had come to seize Adham Khanjar—Sultan’s guest after Khanjar sought refuge in the Pasha’s home—Georges Catroux accused Trenga of negligence after the latter advised the military commander of the Suwayda garrison not to move against Sultan al-Atrash in the wake of the clashes.

Trenga defends his position in his papers preserved in the archives of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces (Ministère des Armées), stating:
“I lived in the Djebel in constant contact with the inhabitants without becoming ‘like the Druze.’ I was able to learn their history, their internal struggles, and their opposition to the Egyptians and the Turks, who were also considered excellent soldiers; and I came to know the heavy losses the Druze inflicted on many columns that fought against them. I saw the forces available to them, their fighting spirit, and their cohesion in the face of danger. All of this was in my mind when I advised caution.” (2)

At the beginning of 1923, against the backdrop of Emir Salim’s first withdrawal from his post as governor of the Djebel, Trenga was appointed for three months as governor of Djebel-Druze, before he himself requested to be relieved of his post after three years of service he considered uncomfortable and under harsh conditions in remote areas such as Dayr al-Zor in eastern Syria and Suwayda at the far south, with no regard for his own well-being and comfort. (3)

3. Documents from the French archives

A large number of French documents discuss the instructions and measures adopted in Djebel-Druze during the first months following the arrival of the French Mandate. Among the most significant is a letter from Georges Catroux to Trenga defining the nature of his work in Djebel-Druze. This eight-page letter (4) functions as a pre-established plan and a set of highly important directives that clarifies the French “real” policy in Djebel-Druze from the outset.

This document is preserved in the French diplomatic archives in Nantes under reference 980/SP, dated 1 July 1921, and titled: “Instructions pour l’Interprète principal Trenga, le conseiller administratif du Djebel Druze.” We quote from it:

“Your mission in the Djebel Druze is primarily and permanently aimed at placing this country, which until now has been practically independent, under the tutelage of the Mandate. Your arrival in Suwayda represents, in this respect, a major step forward. The submission of the Djebel Druze to the Mandatory authority has become a reality, whereas it had previously been only theoretical within the framework of agreements. This is demonstrated by a first fact: the French flag is now flying over the capital of the new State. You know well the effort and prolonged negotiations required to achieve this result, and you fully understand the symbolic value of this Eastern achievement in order to appreciate the importance of your presence in Suwayda. You must make the acceptance and implementation of the Mandate a reality, and this solely by political means, since one cannot for long contemplate obtaining the support of a military garrison. This situation gives your personal position great importance; and I consider it necessary to set out for you the principles that should guide the mission.”

Catroux continues in his letter:

“If we aimed to impose direct administration on the Djebel, this situation would be to our advantage. But it is no longer so, since we decided to apply the Mandate—namely, to govern the country through its own people, under the supervision of our agents alone. The Mandate presupposes the existence of a local government; without it, the necessary foundations are absent. From this standpoint, as you know, I sought to provide a governmental base for our work in the Djebel, even if at times somewhat artificial. I chose Salim Pasha al-Atrash for reasons known to you: his honorary status as ‘supreme leader’ gave him a kind of moral right that made him more acceptable than others. His influence over the al-Atrash family (the leading family in the Djebel), and the alignment of his interests with the two most prominent men within it, Nasib Bey and Abd al-Ghaffar, gave him greater capacities than any other Druze leader.”

Georges Catroux mentions a number of family leaders and how to deal with them, describing some as greedy and others as driven by a taste for display, while focusing on the leaders of three families: al-Atrash, Amer, and al-Halabi.

As for the administrative and organizational form of the Djebel—after a representative council composed of the principal families had been appointed three months before Trenga’s arrival—Catroux writes:

“Although the Djebel Druze is organized as a State, it in fact represents only an autonomous sanjak, and you are its administrative adviser. Nevertheless, you must take into account that you are not alongside an administration already in place, but rather next to a government that has only just been founded and without administrative tradition.

Therefore, before carrying out supervisory duties, you must complete the organization of the administration and the government. You must convene the Government Council and call upon it to draw up a budget balanced between revenues and expenditures, making it clear that ‘the Djebel’ must rely on itself, and that financial assistance from the Mandatory authority will be granted only as loans and for certain expenditures relating to public works, health, and relief. The regulations resulting from this budget become final only after approval.”

On Trenga’s work in influencing Emir Salim al-Atrash, the governor of the Djebel, Catroux states:

“You must activate the administrative apparatus, that is, provide advice and oversight for every act and decision of Salim Pasha. There will be prior oral consultations, after which decisions will be drafted in an official form, signed by the governor and bearing your signature. As for matters of principle—especially projects related to defining the powers of the governor, the Council of Government, and the Administrative Committee—you must submit them to me for my final approval once prepared.”

Catroux assigns Trenga, through this letter, a new urgent and priority task:

“In addition to these obligations of a political and administrative character, you will have to add those relating to your role as head of the intelligence apparatus in the Djebel. It is a mission to which you must devote yourself immediately and carry out methodically and personally. You must begin—as a first priority—by gathering precise information on the extent of the influence exerted by the various forces in the Djebel; determine accurately the clans, their capabilities and vulnerabilities; and know precisely the character of each notable figure in terms of temperament and intentions, and monitor them, so that you can distinguish the real role and the expected influence of both the notables of the Djebel and the notables of Transjordan. You should also gather information on the latter country (Transjordan) because of its particular importance, as well as on the Bedouin who orbit around the Djebel Druze.

You must also subject the country to a comprehensive military inventory: the number of fighters, their armament, their combat efficiency, their capacity for movement, water and food resources, and the key points that must be controlled in the event of an Arab intervention. On the basis of these initial broad lines, you will later add a series of studies or comprehensive reports on the political, economic, social, and religious aspects of the Djebel Druze, with the aim of providing complete and reliable documentation enabling us to make decisions in all fields on clear foundations.”

Trenga did in fact begin his work, sending lengthy intelligence reports on the situation in Djebel-Druze and initiating administrative steps in practice. In a document preserved in the archives of the Ministère des Armées—an intelligence report bearing reference R21 dated 20 August 1921—the first municipal council of Suwayda was elected after a meeting of the notables at the saray. The reason given for forming it (5) was that the city had no regularly elected body. Since there was no authorized person to receive the French forces in the name of the city, the notables of Suwayda met in the saray and elected 21 members who constituted a council, then chose its president. This document records the names of those elected in the city of Suwayda.

4. The gist

The documents show how Georges Catroux began to implement his plan, advancing in practice to bring Djebel-Druze under French tutelage through political means more than military ones.

This can be summarized as follows:

  • His appointment of Officer Trenga, who played a pivotal multi-task role: administrative adviser, interpreter-officer, and head of intelligence in Djebel-Druze; he operated within a complex network of family tensions and local conflicts, drawing on Catroux’s directives to gather precise intelligence and provide in-depth field analyses.
  • His insistence on balancing direct administration with reliance on local leaders: alongside Trenga’s intensive intelligence role, this helped entrench French influence gradually in the Djebel, paving the way for the first entry of a French military force into Djebel without armed confrontation.
  • His focus on containing the most important figures within the al-Atrash family and his attempt to draw closer to Sultan Pasha.
  • His directives to Trenga to conduct meticulous intelligence studies to assess Druze capabilities and their relationship with Transjordan, so as to avoid any military disturbance coming from Transjordan in support of Emir Abdullah.

Thus, Trenga had only one task left: to find a clear pretext for the first entry of French military forces into Djebel-Druze.

Sources and references

(1) https://swaidamag.com/correspondence-1-ar
(2) Genèse de l’État mandataire – Chapitre VIII. “Conditions de vie des officiers et quotidien du service” (Éditions de la Sorbonne): https://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/45411?lang=en
(3) SHD (Service historique de la Défense), Carton GR4-H-118-003, no. 263/S.P., 13-02-1923
(4) CADN (Centre d’Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes) Carton 1Sl/1/V/551, INSTRUCTIONS POUR L’INTERPÈTE PRINCIPAL TRINGA, 01-07-1921
(5) SHD, Carton GR4-H-118-001, 0063

Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine. (2026). Vol. 1(2). ISSN: 3099-3172 (online).