Dr. Raed Ghanem – Specialist in International Human Rights Law
Introduction
When the Yazidi community was subjected to an attempted genocide by ISIS, the international community was mobilized, and several states launched psychological and social support programs for survivors of violence and rape. Moreover, that attack constituted a catalyst for the formation of an international coalition to combat the organization. This was followed by official recognitions that those violations amounted to acts of genocide, thereby meeting the threshold under international law for classification as crimes against humanity. In January 2023, the German Parliament recognized ISIS crimes against the Yazidis as genocide; in December 2024, the Swiss Parliament unanimously voted to recognize these crimes as genocide; and in August 2023, the British government determined that ISIS practices against the Yazidis in Iraq in 2014 constituted genocide. European courts, most notably in Germany, have also brought charges against ISIS members for genocide and crimes against humanity in trials held and ongoing over recent years.
Nevertheless, the international community today maintains a conspicuous silence regarding the violations targeting members of the Druze community in Suwayda, including acts of violence and rape perpetrated against women by a governmental entity and forces affiliated with it. At this juncture, an important point must be emphasized: as a matter of principle, international law does not distinguish between the perpetrator of such crimes, whether a terrorist organization or an official authority. The decisive factor is that acts committed in a widespread or systematic manner fall within the scope of crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. However, in the case of Suwayda, the international response to these violations has not reflected the same standards applied in the Yazidi case. This raises a critically important question, not only politically, but legally:
How can this disparity in approach be explained when the legal framework that governed ISIS crimes applies equally to violations committed by a governmental entity? And how can this silence not be interpreted as tolerance that permits the reproduction of patterns of abuse previously carried out by terrorist organizations, perhaps even by the same individuals?
Legal Characterization of the Conflict
Over recent months, Suwayda Governorate has witnessed a series of acts of systematic violence, which at certain stages took on an offensive character targeting civilians on religious and collective grounds, reaching their peak in mid-July. This underscores the necessity of determining the nature of the conflict as a fundamental and crucial step, as it directly determines the applicable legal rules.
The structure of the attacks and the multiplicity of forces involved, including local armed groups, foreign fighters, and transnational organizations, indicate the existence of a non-international armed conflict, in accordance with the criteria established by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law constitute the governing legal framework, with the possible application of certain rules of international human rights law by virtue of the Syrian state’s binding legal obligations to protect civilians.
Qualification of Violations under International Law
Considering the form and nature of the violations committed in Suwayda, several may be distinguished, not exhaustively but based on their significance:
Attacks against Civilians
Given that international law absolutely prohibits the targeting of civilians, the attacks on civilian towns and villages in AS- Suwayda, as well as indiscriminate shelling without distinction between combatants and non-combatants (as evidenced by certain materials), constitute serious violations and may amount to war crimes under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
Targeting a Specific Religious Group (the Druze)
Certain incidents contain indications of the targeting of a specific religious group, whether through rhetoric accompanying the attacks, patterns of victim selection on the ground, or practices carrying ideological connotations, such as summary executions following questions about a person’s religion, the burning of places of worship, and the humiliation of religious elders and symbols. Legally, under the Rome Statute, an attack against an identifiable group on religious or identity grounds constitutes the crime of persecution, one of the crimes against humanity, if linked to a systematic policy or a repeated pattern.
Presence of Foreign Fighters
Some visual evidence shows that foreign fighters participated in operations directed against areas in Suwayda, elevating the violations to the level of transnational organized crime and terrorist offenses, and placing them within broad jurisdiction under relevant UN Security Council resolutions (2170 and 2178).
Inhumane Treatment of the Dead
Reports have indicated the mistreatment of victims’ bodies, leaving them unburied or without dignified transfer. A set of images also showed bodies in advanced decomposition lying in streets and among homes in certain villages still under government control. These acts constitute a direct breach of Rule 115 of customary international humanitarian law and Article 17 of Additional Protocol I, thereby forming part of war crimes once the elements of repetition and intent are established.
Legal Responsibility
In the days following the attacks, accusations were exchanged regarding which party bears responsibility for what occurred. Based on legal principles and standards, responsibility may be apportioned as follows:
- Individual criminal responsibility, encompassing military commanders, direct perpetrators, those who issued orders, or those who failed to prevent or punish crimes. In this context, the use of foreign fighters increases the legal responsibility of the coordinating or facilitating party.
- State responsibility, even if the state was not a direct perpetrator, insofar as international human rights law imposes upon it the duty to protect civilians, investigate violations, and prosecute perpetrators. Any failure in this regard may therefore constitute an internationally wrongful act.
- Accountability of non-state armed groups (tribal fighters), which in non-international armed conflicts are directly bound by international humanitarian law and enjoy no immunity, as demonstrated by precedents in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia.
Available Accountability Mechanisms
Levels of accountability vary depending on feasibility and the gravity of violations, in an escalating manner. As a matter of principle, the primary responsibility for accountability rests with the state in which the violations occurred. However, the absence of an independent judiciary and the lack of separation of powers in Syria severely limit the possibility of domestic accountability, particularly since investigative committees were established by decision of a government fundamentally implicated in the events. This deprives such committees of the most essential elements of successful investigation and accountability: independence and impartiality.
In light of this incapacity, recourse to international law and reliance on international accountability mechanisms becomes the most viable option. This path is not without complexity, due to several factors, including the paralysis of the Security Council with respect to any referral to the International Criminal Court. Consequently, available options remain limited to alternative mechanisms such as the exercise of universal jurisdiction in European states, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), and fact-finding missions tasked with collecting evidence and transforming it into case files suitable for judicial proceedings.
In parallel with these avenues, it is essential to emphasize the role of community-based and human rights documentation in recording the names of victims, the circumstances of attacks, the identities of fighters, as well as visual evidence and testimonies, in preparation for any future transitional justice process.
Conclusion
From a legal perspective, it is inappropriate to confine what occurred in Suwayda to the characterization of a local clash and to isolate it from being a microcosm of a broader reality in Syria, where governmental incapacity intersects with organized violations. It is therefore imperative to resort to the principles of international law not only to document facts and safeguard victims’ rights in preparation for any future accountability, but also to confront the double standards with which the international community has addressed the Suwayda issue. Such double standards risk laying the foundation for a long-term negative trajectory that undermines the effectiveness of international law in protecting minority rights and combating extremism and authoritarianism, values that have long served as guarantees for human rights and human dignity.
Swaida Intellectual Digital Magazine 1, 2026, ISSN: 3099-3172 (online)
